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1. A tax policy dilemma
Under a pure comprehensive income tax the taxpayer faces the same marginal tax rate
on all types of income, since the tax schedule is applied to the sum of his income from
all sources. This feature of non-discrimination is often seen as the main virtue of the
comprehensive income tax.
In practice, income from capital tends to be taxed at a lower rate than labour income
in most OECD countries.1 One reason is that social security taxes are usually levied only
on labour income. Another reason is that governments have chosen to grant tax favours to
important forms of capital income such as the imputed return on owner-occupied housing
and the return to saving for retirement. Some countries also tax ordinary interest income
at concessionary rates, and capital gains are rarely taxed at the high marginal rates
applied to labour income, due to the distortionary lock-in eﬀects of realization-based
capital gains taxation.
A tt h es a m et i m et h ec o e x i s t e n c eo ft h ec o r p o r a t ea n dt h ep e r s o n a li n c o m et a xm a y
potentially drive the total eﬀective tax rate on corporate equity income signiﬁcantly above
the tax rate imposed on other forms of capital income. To prevent undue discrimination
against corporate investment, most OECD governments therefore alleviate the double
taxation of corporate equity income in one way or another, e.g., by granting dividend
tax credits or by taxing dividends at a reduced rate at the shareholder level. However,
while this reduces investment distortions, it also means that the labour income earned
by corporate owner-managers is often taxed at a much lower rate than labour income
earned outside the corporate sector.
Thus governments are faced with a dilemma. If they want to avoid tax discrimination
against investment in the corporate sector, they must alleviate the double taxation of
corporate equity income to bring the total tax on the return to corporate investment
2in line with the tax rate applied to other forms of capital income. But tax relief for
dividends and capital gains on shares may open the door to tax avoidance via income
shifting: if labour income is taxed more heavily than corporate equity income, controlling
shareholders working in their own company may reduce their tax bill by transforming
management wages into dividends or capital gains on shares.
This dilemma is particularly acute in countries which have introduced some form of
dual income tax where income from capital is taxed at a low ﬂat rate while progressive
surtaxes are levied only on labour income. The dual income tax exists in its purest form
in Norway, Sweden and Finland, but several other countries such as Austria, Belgium,
France, Iceland, Italy, Japan and Portugal have moved in the direction of dual income
taxation by introducing a separate ﬂat tax on interest income at a rate considerably below
the top marginal tax rate on labour income. In these countries any attempt to reduce
the total tax burden on corporate equity to the level of the interest income tax would
imply a huge tax saving for entrepreneurs who can transform labour income earned in
the corporate sector into dividends or capital gains on shares.
In Norway a government-appointed expert committee has recently proposed a way
out of this dilemma (Skatteutvalget, 2003). The committee suggested a new system of
shareholder income taxation which will ensure investment neutrality and yet prevent any
signiﬁcant gains from income shifting by corporate owner-managers. Although developed
in a Norwegian context, the proposal is relevant for all countries experimenting with
some form of dual income taxation. Indeed, even in countries which try to adhere to
the principle of comprehensive income taxation, the dilemma described above will exist
to the extent that social security taxes are only levied on labour income. Moreover,
the proposed system of shareholder income taxation represents a new approach to the
perennial problem of integrating the corporate and the personal income tax. Hence the
Norwegian proposal should be of general interest to an international audience.
Against this background the present paper reviews the recent report from the Norwe-
gian tax reform committee. As a starting point, Part 2 brieﬂy describes the Norwegian
experience with the dual income tax. Part 3 then provides an overview of the new sys-
tem of shareholder income taxation proposed by the Norwegain committee, analyzing the
neutrality properties of the system and explaining how it prevents tax avoidance. The
3concluding Part 4 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed share-
holder income tax compared to other forms of neutral capital income taxation previously
s u g g e s t e di nt h el i t e r a t u r e .
2. The Norwegian experience with the dual income tax
2.1. The Norwegian tax reform of 1992
As already mentioned, several countries have recently moved towards some form of dual
income taxation. In its purest form, the dual income tax is characterized by the following
features: 1) A ﬂat uniform personal tax on all forms of capital income, levied at a rate
equal to the corporate income tax rate; 2) Full relief for the double taxation of corporate
equity income; 3) A broad tax base for capital income and corporate income, aiming
to bring taxable income in line with true economic income, and 4) A basic tax rate on
labour income equal to the capital income tax rate combined with a progressive surtax
on high labour income.2
The case for this variant of schedular income taxation has been discussed at length
by Sørensen (1994, 1998) and Cnossen (1995, 2000). The arguments for the dual income
tax include, among other things, the need to keep the capital income tax low in a small
open economy faced with the possibility of capital ﬂight; the advantages of aligning
the personal capital income tax rate with the corporate tax rate to reduce investment
distortions and to limit the scope for tax arbitrage, and the political economy observation
that it is easier to preserve a broad and fairly neutral capital income tax base when the
capital income tax rate is not too high.
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 introduced the cleanest version of the dual income
tax found so far. The reform was remarkable for its boldness and consistency. The cor-
porate tax rate was almost cut in half, to a level of 28 percent, and a similar ﬂat tax rate
on personal capital income and on labour income below a certain threshold was intro-
duced, combined with a two-bracket progressive surtax on high labour income. At the
same time the tax base - in particular the business income tax base - was broadened very
substantially. Various special tax credits and deductions were abolished, depreciation
rates for tax purposes were brought much closer to prevailing estimates of true economic
4depreciation rates, and realized capital gains on business assets were included in the tax
base.
Double taxation of dividends was fully relieved via an imputation system granting full
credit for the underlying corporation tax against the personal tax on dividends. Reﬂecting
the zeal with which Norwegian policy makers pursued the goal of tax neutrality, the 1992
tax reform also introduced an innovative method for alleviating the double taxation of
retained corporate proﬁts: in calculating the taxable capital gain on shares, shareholders
were allowed to step up the basis of their shares by an amount equal to the taxable
corporate income retained in the corporation. Thus the capital gains tax was levied only
on gains in excess of the retained proﬁt which had already been taxed at the corporate
level.3
Estimates of marginal eﬀective tax rates indicated that the tax reform of 1992 led
to a much more neutral system of capital income taxation, by eliminating tax subsidies
to many types of investment with low pre-tax proﬁtability. After 1992 the Norwegian
economy experienced a signiﬁcant rise in the average pre-tax rate of return on business
investment and a rise in the private savings rate. In addition, there was a signiﬁcant
increase in corporate distributions, reﬂecting a higher degree of capital mobility within
the corporate sector and between the corporate and the household sector. Although part
of this development may have resulted from an upturn of the business cycle, there is little
doubt that the tax reform of 1992 contributed to the improved allocation of capital in
the Norwegian economy (see Skatteutvalget, 2003, chapter 3).
The most obvious shortcoming of the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 related to the
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. For political reasons, the taxable rent imputed
to homeowners was set at an unrealistically low level, despite the fact that the tax law
allowed full deductibility of mortgage interest expenses from the capital income tax base.
As a consequence, the post-1992 tax system continued to imply substantial tax subsidies
to investment in owner-occupied housing. The Norwegian wealth tax also continued
to be applied in a highly discriminatory manner across diﬀerent asset types, distorting
investment incentives for the wealthy. Finally, the tax treatment of small enterprises
under the dual income tax turned out to be a problem.
52.2. Taxing income from small enterprises: the Achilles Heel of the dual in-
come tax
In small and medium-sized enterprises it is quite common that (some of) the owners work
in their own ﬁrm, typically as managers. For these ’active’ owners the income from the
ﬁrm is partly a remuneration for their labour and partly a return the the capital they
have invested in the enterprise. If capital income is taxed at a much lower (marginal) rate
than labour income, active owners obviously have a tax incentive to label income from
the ﬁrm as capital income rather than labour income, e.g., by transforming management
wages into dividends or capital gains on shares. To prevent such tax avoidance, a dual
income tax must include rules stipulating how the income from ﬁrms with active owners
is to be split into capital income and labour income.4
Under the Norwegian dual income tax, income splitting is mandatory for entrepre-
neurs who carry out a certain minimum amount of work in their ﬁrm and who have an
ownership share of at least two thirds in the ﬁrm. When calculating the ownership share,
shares owned by closely related persons are added to the shares owned directly by the
entrepreneur himself. For taxpayers satisfying the work test and the ownership test the
taxable income from the ﬁrm is split into an imputed return on the business assets, which
is taxed as capital income, and the residual proﬁt, which is taxed as labour income. How-
ever, if the residual proﬁt exceeds a certain cap, the excess amount is taxed as capital
income (except for the professions such as doctors, lawyers etc.). The motivation for this
rule is that if the residual proﬁt is very high relative to a normal wage income, part of this
proﬁt is likely to represent a return to capital rather than a reward for labour. Further-
more, entrepreneurs with employees may deduct 20 percent of their wage bill from the
residual proﬁt subject to progressive taxation, up to a certain limit. The oﬃcial rationale
for this ’salary deduction’ is that the estimated labour income for owners of ﬁrms with
little physical investment and many employees would otherwise be unreasonably high,
and that the deduction is meant to compensate for the fact that self-created goodwill
is not included in the basis for calculating the imputed rate of return on capital. With
af e wm o d i ﬁcations, the basis for calculating the imputed rate of return is the stock of
business assets recorded in the ﬁrm’s tax accounts. The rate of return is currently set
equal to the interest rate on ﬁve year government bonds plus a risk premium of 4 percent.
6In 2003 the imputed rate of return is 10 percent.
The Norwegian rules for mandatory income splitting are applied to sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships and corporations with active owners. The rules were meant to prevent
tax avoidance through income shifting, but for corporate ﬁrms they seem to have had lit-
tle success in achieving this goal. Between 1992 and 2000 the proportion of corporations
subject to income splitting fell from 55 percent to 32 percent, indicating that a growing
number of taxpayers were able to avoid income splitting by inviting ’passive’ owners into
the company. Moreover, in the late 1990s almost 80 percent of the ’active’ shareholders
subject to income splitting had a negative labour income for tax purposes, suggesting
that the deductions from the estimated labour income were much too favourable.
Two trends in the 1990s contributed to the undermining of the Norwegian system of
income splitting for active owners. Between 1992 and 2003 the wedge between the top
marginal eﬀective tax rate on labour income (including payroll tax and social security tax)
and the tax rate on capital income rose from 28.1 percentage points to 36.7 percentage
points, increasing the incentive to transform labour income into capital income for tax
purposes.5 Moreover, in the decade following the tax reform the rules for income splitting
were changed on several occasions, mostly in the direction of a more favourable tax
treatment of active owners. At the turn of the new century it was therefore widely felt that
the Norwegian income splitting system had failed to achieve its goal of securing an equal
tax treatment of active owners and other groups of taxpayers. Reforming or replacing
this system was thus an important part of the mandate for the tax reform committee
established by the Norwegian government at the beginning of 2002 and releasing its report
in February 2003.
3. The Norwegian tax reform committee of 2003
The Norwegian tax reform committee, headed by former Minister of Finance Arne Skauge,
suggested a wide range of changes in the entire tax system. The basic guideline for the
Skauge committee was a desire to strengthen the principles of tax neutrality underlying
the pathbreaking 1992 reform. Hence the committee proposed to raise the taxation of
the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing to a more realistic level. It also proposed
7to phase out the highly discriminatory Norwegian wealth tax and to recoup (part of) the
lost revenue via a general tax on immovable property and/or via a (further) rise in the
tax on imputed rent. The idea was to improve resource allocation and to allow for the
growing international mobility of capital by lowering the tax burden on mobile capital
while reducing the tax subsidies to immobile capital. In addition, the committee proposed
several measures to broaden the tax base and to lower the high marginal tax rates on
labour income, with the aim of reducing incentives for income shifting and stimulating
labour supply.
T h eS k a u g ec o m m i t t e ed e v o t e dal a r g ep a r to fi t se ﬀorts to analyzing alternative
solutions to the problems of income splitting and income shifting under the dual income
tax. In the remainder of this paper I will focus on these aspects of the committee report
which involve the classical problem of integrating the corporate and the personal income
tax.
3.1. Some roads not taken
Before describing the Norwegian committee proposal for corporate-personal tax integra-
tion, it may be of interest to consider a couple of the alternatives which were analyzed
but rejected by the committee.
Progressive taxation of personal capital income. Since the need for splitting the in-
come of active owners arises from the diﬀerential tax treatment of capital and labour,
it might seem natural to give up the dual income tax and return to a comprehensive
income tax where personal income from capital is taxed at the same marginal rate as
labour income. The main reason why the Skauge committee did not recommend such
a solution was the desire to keep the personal tax rate on capital income in line with
the corporate tax rate. Because of the high international mobility of corporate invest-
ment and the diﬃculty of implementing residence-based taxation of corporate income,
the committee found it undesirable to raise the Norwegian corporate income tax rate.
Under a comprehensive income tax the marginal personal tax rate on capital income
would therefore have to be much higher than the corporate tax rate, even if the top
marginal personal tax rates were brought down considerably. Given the impracticality
of accruals-based taxation of capital gains on shares, accumulation of retained proﬁts
8within the corporate sector would then be favoured by the tax system, compared to sav-
ing and investment via the open capital market. This might cause capital to be locked
into relatively unproductive investment projects in existing corporations, as was the case
before the tax reform of 1992. In addition, even under moderate inﬂation, full progres-
sive taxation of nominal capital income coupled with full interest deductibility would
imply overtaxation of the real return to saving and would amplify the tax subsidies to
homeownership in the likely case where a realistic rental value could not be imputed to
homeowners. Finally, reintroducing progressive capital income taxation might open the
door to tax arbitrage exploiting diﬀerences in marginal tax rates across taxpayers. Hence
the committee (except for one member) recommended to maintain the dual income tax.
A classical corporate tax system. While the Norwegian income splitting system has
failed to prevent tax avoidance by active shareholders, it has worked reasonably well for
sole proprietorships where it is much more diﬃcult to avoid mandatory income splitting
via changes in the ﬁrm’s ownership structure. One way of coping with income shifting
might then be to maintain the splitting system for proprietors, and to impose a personal
tax on dividends and capital gains on shares to ensure a total corporate and personal
tax burden on shareholder income roughly equal to the top marginal tax rate on labour
income. In this way active shareholders would not be able to reduce their tax bill by
paying themselves shareholder income rather than managerial wages. Although such
a system would involve an additional tax burden on shareholder income compared to
other forms of capital income, this might not increase the cost of equity capital for
Norwegian companies whose shares are traded in international stock markets, since the
marginal shareholders in these companies are likely to be foreigners who are not subject
to Norwegian personal tax rules. However, the Skauge committee was concerned that
full double taxation of corporate equity income would distort investment in small and
medium-sized Norwegian companies without access to the international stock market.
The committee was aware that, in a small open economy where some shares are traded
in the international stock market whereas others are not, a tax on personal shareholder
income will not necessarily drive up the average required return on non-traded shares, as
pointed out by Apel and Södersten (1999). But as shown in the appendix to the present
paper, a personal tax on the full return to shares will systematically distort the pattern
9of risk-taking by raising t h er e q u i r e dr a t eo fr e t u r no nn o n - t r a d e ds h a r e sw h o s er e t u r n s
are weakly correlated with the return on the market portfolio of shares, while reducing
the required risk premium on non-traded shares whose returns are strongly correlated
with the return on the market portfolio. Intuitively, for highly risky shares with a strong
covariance with the market portfolio, the beneﬁt from the income insurance oﬀered by
a symmetric tax on dividends and capital gains (with full loss oﬀset) outweighs the fact
that the tax reduces the average net rate of return relative to the net return on safe
assets. In contrast, for shares with low riskiness the insurance eﬀect of the tax is less
important, so the tax makes the holding of such shares less attractive. A personal tax on
the full return to shares will therefore tend to stimulate investment in small companies
whose proﬁts vary strongly with the business cycle, at the expense of investment in small
companies with a low sensitivity to the cycle. The Skauge committee felt that it would be
hard to preserve and promote the general principles of tax neutrality in other areas of the
tax system if the committee proposed a form of double taxation of shareholder income
which would systematically distort the pattern of investment in small and medium-sized
companies. Hence the committee looked for a way of taxing corporate equity income
which would be neutral while at the same time eliminating the scope for income shifting.
3.2. A neutral shareholder income tax: the basic design
Having rejected the alternatives discussed above, the Norwegian tax reform committee
proposed instead that the income splitting system for ’active’ shareholders be replaced by
a personal tax on the equity premium, i.e., a personal tax on returns to shares in excess of
the after-tax interest rate on government bonds.6 According to the proposal, the equity
premium is included in the shareholder’s taxable capital income. The combination of
corporation tax and personal capital income tax means that corporate equity income
above the normal return to saving will be taxed at a total marginal rate which is roughly
in line with the top marginal tax rate on labour income, given the tax schedule for labour
income proposed by the committee. In principle this will eliminate the scope for income
shifting by active shareholders. The present section explains the basic design features of
this shareholder income tax and illustrates the neutrality properties of the system. The
subsequent sections will discuss further aspects of the system.
10The shareholder income tax is supposed to be levied on the equity premium on shares
in Norwegian and foreign companies owned by personal taxpayers resident in Norway.
The imputed return which is deducted from taxable shareholder income will be termed
the Rate-of-Return-Allowance, denoted RRA. The tax is levied on the realized income
from shares after deduction of the RRA. The realized income from a share consists of the
dividend plus any realized capital gain minus any realized capital loss. A realized loss
o no n es h a r em a yb eo ﬀset against gains on other shares, and any remaining loss may
be carried forward with interest (see the detailed discussion of loss oﬀsets in section 3.3).
The RRA is the product of the after-tax interest rate and the stepped-up basis (SUB) of
the share at the start of the year. The SUB is the sum of the original acquisition price
of the share and all the RRAs on the share not utilized in previous years. If the RRA
exceeds the realized income from the share in any given year, the unutilized part of the
RRA is thus added to the basis of the share for the following year.
A simple numerical example may illustrate the workings of these rules and demon-
strate that the shareholder income tax is in principle neutral. We consider a shareholder
who injects equity into a company at the start of year 1, receives a dividend at the end of
year 1, and a dividend or a capital gain on the share at the end of year 2. The after-tax
interest rate as well as the return to the company’s investment after corporation tax
are assumed to be 5%. We thus consider a corporate investment project which is just
barely worth undertaking in the absence of the shareholder income tax. The example
assumes that one krone retained in the corporation will ceteris paribus generate a one
krone increase in the value of shares in the company, as long as the retained proﬁtd o e s
not exceed the shareholder’s tax free imputed return.7 The transactions of the company
and the shareholder are as follows:
Year 1
1. Injection of equity at the start of the year 1000
2. Proﬁt after corporation tax (5% of 1.) 50
3. Dividend 30
4. Retained proﬁt (2.-3.) 20
5. RRA (5% of 1.) 50
6. Unutilized RRA (5.-3.) 20
11Year 2
7. Stepped-up basis of share (1.+6.) 1020
8. Proﬁt after corporation tax (5% of (1.+4.)) 51
9. RRA (5% of 7.) 51
Scenario 1: Shares are realized at the end of year 2
10. Revenue from sale of share at the end of year 2 (1.+4.+8.) 1071
11. Stepped-up basis of share at the start of year 2 (=7.) 1020
12. RRA for year 2 (=9.) 51
13. Taxable capital gain (10.-11.-12.) 0
Scenario 2: All proﬁts are distributed at the end of year 2
14. Dividend at the end of year 2 (4.+8.) 71
15. Total RRA (6.+9.) 71
16. Taxable dividend (14.-15.) 0
Whether the shareholder’s return takes the form of dividends or capital gains, we
see that he will end up with zero taxable income in both scenarios. Hence a corporate
investment which is marginal in the absence of the shareholder income tax will still be
marginal in the presence of the tax, i.e., the shareholder tax will leave the cost of corporate
capital unaﬀected.8 In particular, note that the step-up of the shareholder’s basis ensures
that a marginal corporate investment ﬁnanced by retained proﬁts is shielded from tax
at the shareholder level. Via the step-up of basis, an RRA which is not utilized in the
current year is eﬀectively carried forward at an interest rate equal to the imputed normal
return on the stepped-up basis. A corporate investment project ﬁnanced by retentions
and yielding a normal rate of return will be shielded from shareholder tax through this
carry-forward mechanism. Hence the system is neutral between ﬁnancing by new equity
and ﬁnancing by retained earnings.
Just as it does not distort real investment decisions, the shareholder income tax will
not distort the timing of the realization of shares, even though the capital gains tax is
deferred until the time of realization. This is illustrated by the example below, where the
shareholder at the end of year zero holds shares with a current market value above the
stepped-up basis, reﬂecting large capital gains accrued in the past. The shareholder may
12postpone the realization of his gain until the end of year 1 (Scenario 1), or he may realize
it immediately and invest his funds in the capital market (Scenario 2). In both cases he
is assumed to earn an expected normal rate of return equal to 5% of his wealth before
shareholder tax. In the absence of the tax he will thus be indiﬀerent between immediate
or postponed realization of his accrued capital gain. The example shows that he will also
be equally well oﬀ in the two scenarios after the introduction of the shareholder income
tax (assumed to be levied at the 28% rate applied to capital income in Norway):
The shareholder’s status at the end of year 0
1. Stepped-up basis of share 1000
2. Market value of share 2000
Scenario 1: The share is held until the end of year 1
3. Revenue from sale of share at the end of year 1 (105% of 2.) 2100
4 .R R Af o ry e a r1( 5 %o f1 . ) 5 0
5. Taxable capital gain at the end of year 1 (3.-1.-4.) 1050
6. Tax on capital gain (28%of 5.) 294
7. The taxpayer’s wealth at the end of year 1 (3.-6.) 1806
Scenario 2: The share is sold at the end of year 0 and the
revenue is invested in the capital market
8. Revenue from sale of share at the end of year 0 (=2.) 2000
9. Taxable capital gain at the end of year 0 (8.-1.) 1000
10. Tax on capital gain at the end of year 0 (28% of 9.) 280
11. Funds available for investment in bonds at the start of year 1 (8.-10.) 1720
12. The taxpayer’s wealth at the end of year 1 (105% of 11.) 1806
We see that the shareholder income tax will neither encourage nor discourage the
realization of shares. In a similar way one can show that the tax will not distort the
decision to realize a loss. Like the retrospective capital gains tax proposed by Auerbach
(1991) and the generalized cash ﬂow tax described by Auerbach and Bradford (2001), the
shareholder income tax is neutral towards realization decisions even though tax is due
only when assets are realized. As the reader may verify, the rate-of-return allowance is
crucial for this neutrality property.
133.3. The shareholder income tax, loss oﬀsets, and risk taking
The numerical examples above abstracted from uncertainty and risk aversion. In an
uncertain economic environment with risk averse investors, the neutrality properties of
the shareholder income tax will depend crucially on the tax treatment of losses. To ensure
t h eg r e a t e s tp o s s i b l ed e g r e eo fn e u t r a l i t y ,t h eS k a u g ec o m m i t t e ep r o p o s e dasymmetric
treatment of gains and losses on shares. Just as the shareholder is liable to tax on the
excess of his realized return over the after-tax interest rate on government bonds (the
RRA), he should be allowed to record a loss for tax purposes if his realized income from
shares falls short of his opportunity cost, given by the RRA. Thus the diﬀerence between
the RRA and the realized return on shares should either be deductible against other
current income, or the shareholder should be allowed to carry his ’loss’ forward with
interest to preserve the present value of the loss oﬀset.
The appendix analyzes the eﬀects of such a symmetric shareholder income tax on the
required rate of return on shares when investors are risk averse. The analysis is based
on a variant of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, adapted to the context of a small open
economy like Norway. The model distinguishes between ’quoted’ shares which are traded
internationally, and ’unquoted’ shares which are only traded in the domestic market. In a
small open economy the required return on quoted shares will be given exogenously from
the world capital market and will hence be unaﬀected by a residence-based personal tax
on Norwegian shareholders. The question is whether the required return on the unquoted
shares issued by small and medium-sized domestic companies will also be unaﬀected by
a symmetric shareholder income tax with full loss oﬀsets? If that is the case, the tax will
be fully neutral towards corporate investment decisions.
As shown in the appendix, if shareholders have well-diversiﬁed portfolios in which
unquoted shares have a small weight, the required expected after-tax rate of return on
unquoted shares (Re
u) may be approximated by the equation
R
e







where i is the RRA, i.e., the after-tax rate of interest on risk-free bonds, Re
q is the required
expected after-tax rate of return on quoted shares, and β is the ratio of the covariance
between Re
u and Re
q to the variance of Re
q.T h u s ,t h eg r e a t e rt h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e nRe
u
14and Re
q, i.e., the more the holding of unquoted shares adds to the risk on the shareholder’s
total portfolio, the greater is the required risk premium on unquoted shares. Let re
u og re
q
denote the required expected pre-tax returns on unquoted and quoted shares, respectively,
and let t be the rate of shareholder income tax on the equity premia re
u − i and re
q − i.
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Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), we get
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The short-term interest rate i is determined by monetary policy, and the required
return re
q on quoted shares is exogenously given from the world market. Moreover, if σ2
q is
the variance of re
q and σuq is the covariance between re
u and re








as shown in the appendix. It then follows that the required return on unquoted shares
will indeed be unaﬀected by the shareholder income tax, since t does not appear in (4).
This neutrality result assumes that shareholder portfolios are well-diversiﬁed.9 In prac-
tice the holders of shares in small companies have often invested a large proportion of
their equity in a single unquoted company, perhaps because they wish to secure full
control of the ﬁrm, or because asymmetric information and adverse selection in capital
markets make risk sharing with outside investors diﬃcult. In this case of incomplete
diversiﬁcation the shareholder income tax will have two oﬀsetting eﬀects on re
u.O nt h e
one hand the symmetric tax will induce risk-averse shareholders to increase their hold-
ings of quoted shares, because it reduces the volatility of the net rate of return. With
a positive covariance between the pre-tax returns on quoted and unquoted shares, the
larger holdings of quoted shares means that the holding of unquoted shares adds more
to the total risk on the taxpayer’s portfolio. This will tend to increase the required risk
premium on unquoted shares. On the other hand, the shareholder income tax also re-
duces the variability of the net return on unquoted shares, and this tends to reduce the
required risk premium.10 In the appendix I show that the latter eﬀect will always dom-
inate, unless the returns to the two types of shares are perfectly correlated. Hence the
15required return on unqoted shares will generally fall, thereby stimulating real investment
in unquoted companies. Note that this non-neutrality is likely to be socially desirable,
since one would expect that the owners of small companies are inclined to take too little
risk from a social perspective when they have failed to diversify their portfolios.
In summary, when taxpayers have well diversiﬁed portfolios, the impact of the share-
holder income tax on re
u will be negligible, and when the owners of small companies hold
as i g n i ﬁcant part of their equity in the form of unquoted shares in their own company,
the tax is likely to improve the allocation of risk.
The approximate neutrality of the shareholder income tax relies on the symmetry
of the tax: whenever the realized rate of return rA on some share A falls short of the
risk-free after-tax interest rate, the shareholder is entitled to a deduction with a present
value equal to i − rA times the stepped-up basis of the share. To ensure a maximum
degree of neutrality and to minimize the amounts to be carried forward, it might seem
natural to allow taxpayers to deduct any tax losses on individual shares against current
taxable income from other shares as well as against current ordinary income (which is
taxed at the same basic rate as shareholder income, according to the committee proposal).
The Skauge committee did indeed propose that a realized tax loss from the sale of any
individual share should be deductable against current taxable income from other shares
in the same year. However, to protect the Norwegian tax base, the committee suggested
two mild limitations on loss oﬀsets. First, as long as the taxpayer does not realize share
A, he should not be allowed to deduct unutilized RRAs imputed to share A against his
income from some other share B. Instead, the unutilized RRA is added to the basis of
share A and is thus carried forward with a rate of return equal to the RRA. Second, if the
shareholder sells some share A with a tax loss L, he can deduct this loss against any other
taxable shareholder income Y i nt h es a m ey e a r ,b u ti fL>Y, that part of the remaining
loss L − Y which stems from unutilized RRAs should not be deductible against current
ordinary income. Instead, these remaining unutilized RRAs should be carried forward
and deducted against future shareholder income, with an interest premium equal to the
RRA. In the absence of these limitations taxpayers might use RRAs from low-yielding
shares to shield current income from high-yielding shares and current income from other
sources, and then subsequently move out of Norway before selling their high-yielding
16shares at a gain which could no longer be subjected to Norwegian tax.11
The loss oﬀset rules proposed by the Skauge committee ensure that deductions for
tax losses preserve their present value and that the taxpayer will always obtain full loss
oﬀset provided he earns positive taxable income from shares at some point in the future.
But taxpayers who never receive positive future shareholder income in excess of the RRA
will not be fully compensated for tax losses stemming from unutilized RRAs. In the eyes
of the committee, one has to live with this asymmetry in order to protect the Norwegian
tax base. To compensate for this (mild) limitation on loss oﬀsets, the Skauge committee
suggested that the RRA should be set equal to the after-tax interest rate on ﬁve-year
government bonds which normally includes a slight risk premium compared to the risk-
free short term interest rate.
3.4. Debt versus equity
The shareholder income tax implies that returns to shares above the going market interest
rate will be subject to double taxation, whereas interest on debt will only be taxed once at
the ordinary capital income income tax rate. This asymmetry might induce companies
to distribute their earnings in the form of interest on debt rather than in the form of
equity income. Subordinated debt is often a close substitute for equity, and interest on
such debt typically includes a substantial risk premium. Hence it may be possible to
avoid the shareholder income tax by paying out above-normal rates of return in the form
of interest on loans from shareholders to the company.
To discourage substitution of single-taxed debt for double-taxed equity, the Skauge
committee therefore proposed that whenever the interest rate on a loan from a personal
taxpayer to a company exceeds the RRA plus a risk premium of 2-4 percentage points
(to reﬂect that there is no deduction for the foregone interest income in case of default
on the debt), the excess interest income should be subject to the shareholder income tax.
3.5. Distortions to the choice of organizational form?
Since the shareholder income tax can only deal with the problem of income shifting in
the corporate sector, it is necessary to maintain the income splitting system for sole
17proprietorships and partnerships under the Norwegian dual income tax. One may ask
whether the diﬀerent tax treatment of corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms will distort the
choice of organizational form? Under certain restrictive assumptions, the answer is ”no”.
Speciﬁcally, if there are no credit constraints and no risk, and if the total eﬀective tax
rate on the labour income of active shareholders equals the eﬀective tax rate on labour
income earned by proprietors, the tax system proposed by the Skauge committee will be
neutral between the two groups.
This may be illustrated by a simple example. Consider an entrepreneur who invests
one unit of capital in his ﬁrm. Suppose that this business capital yields a pre-tax return
equal to the pre-tax market interest rate r and that the entrepreneur’s work eﬀort in the
ﬁrm generates additional (business) income w. Assume further that all of the after-tax
business income is retained in the ﬁrm in year 1, and that the entrepreneur sells the ﬁrm
at the end of period 2. If he organizes his ﬁrm as a proprietorship, his imputed capital
income under the income splitting system will be r times the stock of business capital
at the start of the period. This imputed return will be taxed as capital income at the
rate t, while the remaining business income will be taxed as labour income at the rate τ.
Denoting the after-tax interest rate by i ≡ r(1 − t), the situation for the proprietor may
then be summarized as follows, assuming that the value of the ﬁrm at the end of year 2
equals the assets accumulated in the ﬁrm at that time:
Scenario 1: The ﬁrm is organized as a proprietorship
Year 1
1. Initial capital stock: 1
2. Business income before tax: r + w
3. Tax bill: tr + τw
4. Retained after-tax business income (2.-3.): i + w(1 − τ)
Year 2
5. Initial capital stock (1.+4.): 1+i + w(1 − τ)
6. Business income before tax (r×(5.)+w): r[1 + i + w(1 − τ)] + w
7. Tax bill: tr[1 + i + w(1 − τ)] + τw
8. Retained after-tax business income (6.-7.): (1 + i)[i + w(1 − τ)]
189. Revenue from sale of ﬁrm (5.+8.): (1 + i)
2 +( 2+i)w(1 − τ)
Suppose alternatively that the ﬁrm is organized as a corporation, and assume (in
accordance with the Skauge committee’s proposal) that the corporate tax rate and the
tax rate on shareholder income are both equal to the capital income tax rate t.S i n c e
no shareholder income is realized in year 1, and since the entrepreneur sells his share at
the end of year 2 at a price equal to the value of the assets accumulated in the ﬁrm, his
situation will be the following, given that the Rate-of-Return Allowance imputed to the
shares equals the after-tax interest rate i:
Scenario 2: The ﬁrm is organized as a corporation
Year 1
10. Initial capital stock = initial basis of shares: 1
11. Business income before tax: r + w
12. Corporate income tax bill: t(r + w)
13. Retained after-tax business income (11.-12.): i + w(1 − t)
Year 2
14. Initial capital stock (10.+13.): 1+i + w(1 − t)
15. Basis of shares at the start of the year: 1+i
16. Business income before tax (r×(14.)+w): r[1 + i + w(1 − t)] + w
17. Corporate income tax: t{r[1 + i + w(1 − t)] + w}
18. Retained after-tax business income (16.-17.): (1 + i)[i + w(1 − t)]
19. Capital stock at the end of the year
= revenue from sale of shares (14.+18.): (1 + i)
2 +( 2+i)w(1 − t)
20. Basis of shares at the end of the year: (1 + i)
2
21. Shareholder income tax (t×(19.-20.)): t(2 + i)w(1 − t)
22. Net revenue from sale of shares (19.-21.): (1 + i)
2 +( 2+i)w(1 − t)
2
Comparing the net revenues in lines 9. and 22., we see that the entrepreneur will be
equally well of under the two organizational forms if (1 − t)
2 =1−τ.A st h er e a d e rm a y
easily verify, this is equivalent to the condition
19t + t(1 − t)=τ (5)
The magnitude on the left-hand side of (5) is the sum of the corporate tax and the
shareholder income tax on labour income earned within a corporation. If this is equal
to the tax rate τ on the imputed labour income of proprietors, the tax system will be
neutral towards the choice of organizational form. Given the tax rates proposed by the
Skauge committee, condition (5) will be roughly met. Note from lines 3. and 12. that
since t<τ under the dual income tax, the proprietor’s tax bill is front-loaded relative to
the tax bill of the owner of a corporation. More generally, the timing of tax payments
will diﬀer under the two organizational forms. Hence the tax neutrality result only holds
in the absence of liquidity constraints.
But even if there are no credit constraints, the neutrality result breaks down once
we allow for risk. When business income ﬂuctuates, the average eﬀective tax rate τ
on the proprietor’s imputed labour income will vary with the level of income, due to
the progressive tax schedule. By contrast, under the corporate organizational form the
entrepreneur can engage in averaging of taxable income by appropriate timing of the
realization of his shareholder income, thereby exploiting the rate-of-return allowance to
the greatest possible extent. Since the proprietor has no similar opportunity for income
averaging, he will tend to have a higher average tax rate over time than the active
shareholder, even if (5) is met in a ’normal’ year. Under risk neutrality the proposed tax
system will thus tend to favour the corporate form of organization. With risk aversion the
situation becomes more complex, since entrepreneurs must then trade oﬀ the additional
income insurance oﬀered by the proprietor’s progressive tax schedule against the higher
average burden of taxation imposed on proprietors relative to active shareholders.
Except in unrealistic circumstances, we see that the combination of the shareholder
income tax and the income splitting system for proprietorships will tend to distort the
choice of organizational form. As a long run measure, the Skauge committee therefore
proposed to replace the income splitting system for proprietors and partnerships by tax
rules closely resembling the rules for corporate ﬁrms. According to the committee’s
suggestions, the imputed return to business assets will still be taxed as capital income,
but the residual business income will be taxed as labour income only to the extent that
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non-corporate ﬁrms will only be taxed at the corporate tax rate.12 Via the timing of
retained proﬁts, the owners of non-corporate ﬁrms will then be able to engage in income
averaging in the same way as active shareholders.
4. The shareholder income tax versus other forms of neutral cap-
ital income taxation
The shareholder income tax is based on the familiar idea that a capital income tax
which allows a deduction for the opportunity cost of ﬁnance will be neutral. It is well
known that a corporate income tax which allows corporations a full deduction for true
economic depreciation and for the cost of ﬁnance leaves the user cost of capital unchanged
(see King (1975), for example). In a context without uncertainty, Boadway and Bruce
(1984) discovered that this neutrality result also holds when depreciation for tax purposes
deviates from true economic depreciation, provided corporations are allowed to deduct
an imputed market rate of interest on the remaining book value of the assets recorded
in their tax accounts. In that case the current tax saving from accelerated depreciation
will be exactly oﬀset by a fall in future rate-of-return allowances of equal present value,
so the timing of depreciation allowances will have no eﬀect on the cost of capital.
The Boadway-Bruce neutrality result provided the intellectual foundation for the
socalled ACE system (Allowance for Corporate Equity) proposed by the Capital Taxes
Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991) and by Devereux and Freeman (1991).
Under this system corporations may deduct an imputed rate of return on their equity
along with their interest expenses. The ACE system was actually implemented in Croatia
from 1994 to the beginning of 2001 (see Rose and Wiswesser (1998) and Keen and King
(2001)), and two government committees recently proposed the ACE as a model for taxing
the rents earned in the petroleum sectors in Denmark and Norway (see Lund (2002a)).
While Boadway and Bruce (1984) abstracted from risk, the contributions by Fane
(1987) and Bond and Devereux (1995) showed that the Boadway-Bruce neutrality result
carries over to a setting with uncertainty. A main point made in these contributions is
that even though other corporate cash ﬂows are risky, the allowance for corporate equity
21should be equal to the risk-free rate of interest, provided the deduction is perfectly certain.
This is a parallel to the result derived in the appendix that a shareholder income tax
with an RRA equal to the risk-free interest rate will ensure (approximate) investment
neutrality.
Policy makers have had diﬃculties understanding why a rate-of-return allowance for
equity should not include a risk premium, given that the equity premium observed in the
stock market is on average positive and quite substantial. Following Lund (2002a and
2002b, pp. 483-484), we may explain this seemingly counterintuitive result as follows.
We know that the cash ﬂow tax proposed by Brown (1948) and many others is neutral
even under uncertainty, because it eﬀectively makes the government a silent partner in
all investment projects, sharing symmetrically in all gains and losses.13 Ac a s hﬂow tax
allows full expensing of investment, generating an immediate tax reduction equal to the
tax rate τ times the investment outlay K. Alternatively one might allow investors to
deduct in all future periods a rate of return RRA on the initial investment outlay. If
the future tax reductions due to the rate-of-return allowances accrue with certainty, they
should be discounted at the risk-free interest rate i. Hence their net present value will
be NPV=τRRA·K/i.I f w e s e t R R A =i,w et h e ng e tNPV=τK, indicating that a rate-
of-return allowance equal to the risk-free rate is suﬃcient to ensure equivalence with the
neutral cash ﬂow tax, even if the other cash ﬂows associated with the investment are
uncertain. As this reasoning shows, the key to the determination of the deductible rate
of return is the degree of certainty with which the reductions in future tax occur. If the
tax savings are not quite certain due to limitations on loss oﬀsets, there is a case for
including a risk premium in the RRA, but in principle the size of that premium should
reﬂect the uncertainty attached to the value of the deduction and not the uncertainty
associated with the other cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm.
While previous writers have proposed that a rate-of-return allowance be granted at
the corporate level based on the asset values recorded in corporate tax accounts, a main
innovation of the shareholder income tax suggested in this paper is that the RRA is
granted at the level of domestic personal shareholders, based on the (stepped-up) value
of their shareholdings. There are two separate policy choices involved here. The most
fundamental choice is whether to oﬀer the allowance to corporations or to shareholders.
22If the allowance is granted to shareholders, the second choice is whether the basis for the
allowance should be the book value of corporate assets or the value of the shares.
There were two main reasons why the Norwegian tax reform committee did not rec-
ommend an equity allowance at the corporate level. First, an ACE system is a form of
progressive corporate income tax imposing a relatively high average tax rate on highly
proﬁtable ﬁrms, especially if the corporate tax rate on taxable proﬁts has to be raised in
order to oﬀset the revenue loss from the rate-of-return allowance. Highly proﬁtable ﬁrms
are often multinationals which bring important intangible assets to the countries where
they invest, and it was not deemed to be in Norway’s interest to introduce a tax system
that might deter such investors.14 Second, for Norwegian subsidiaries of parent companies
h e a d q u a r t e r e di nc o u n t r i e so ﬀering a foreign tax credit for corporate taxes paid in Nor-
way, the rate-of-return allowance would not stimulate the incentive to invest in Norway
but would just transfer revenue from the Norwegian to the foreign governments.
The Skauge committee therefore came down in favour of double tax relief at the
shareholder level. The committee was aware that a rate-of-return allowance to Nor-
wegian residents will not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the cost of equity ﬁnance for widely held
companies whose shares are traded internationally, but as already mentioned it felt that
an allowance is needed to avoid distortions to the cost of equity ﬁnance for small and
medium-sized companies without access to the international stock market (see the ap-
pendix for a theoretical justiﬁcation of this view).
When the allowance is granted to shareholders rather than corporations, it seems most
natural to calculate it on the basis of share values rather than imputing a proportion of the
value of corporate assets to each individual shareholder. To be sure, the latter procedure
would have the advantage of oﬀsetting the distortions to investment decisions implied
by deviations between true economic depreciation and depreciation for tax purposes,
as Boadway and Bruce (1984) pointed out. On the other hand, the assets recorded in
corporate tax accounts often do not include the ﬁrm’s intangible assets, whereas the
value of intangibles will be reﬂected in the shareholder’s acquisition price when he buys
a share. The recorded acquisition prices of shares thus provide a broader and potentially
more neutral basis for calculating the RRA. Moreover, if double tax relief were based on
corporate book values, it would be very diﬃcult to require foreign companies to provide
23the information on asset values necessary for calculating the RRAs for Norwegian holders
of foreign shares. In practice the rate-of-return allowance would then only be granted
to holders of domestic shares, but this might violate Norway’s international obligation
not to impose tax obstacles on the free ﬂow of capital between Norway and the EU. By
contrast, it should be easier for Norwegian taxpayers to document the acquisition price
of their foreign shares for the purpose of obtaining the RRA.
In summary, the shareholder income tax recently suggested by the Norwegian tax
reform committee has a number of attractive neutrality properties, compared to other
proposed solutions to the problems of income shifting and double taxation of corporate
equity income. Time will tell whether these attractions are suﬃcient to persuade policy
makers in Norway and elsewhere to adopt the shareholder income tax.
APPENDIX
SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION
IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
This appendix analyzes the eﬀects of shareholder income taxation on the required
returns to shares in a small open economy. The same issue was studied by Apel and
Södersten (1999), but while they used a mean-variance framework and did not consider
the eﬀects of a rate-of-return allowance (RRA), I will use a variant of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model to derive the eﬀects of a shareholder income tax with and without an
RRA.
The model
Like Apel and Södersten, I distinguish between shares which are traded in the inter-
national stock market (’quoted shares’) and shares which are only traded domestically
(’unquoted shares’). The representative investor invests a fraction vu of his initial wealth
Vo in unquoted shares yielding an uncertain after-tax rate of return Ru, while placing a
fraction vq of his wealth in quoted shares at a risky net rate of return Rq. The remaining
fraction of initial wealth is invested in risk-free bonds paying an after-tax interest rate i.
The investor’s wealth V at the end of the period will then be
24V =[ 1+vuRu + vqRq +( 1− vu − vq)i]Vo (A.1)
yielding utility U(V ),w h e r eU  > 0 and U   < 0. Taking a second-order Taylor expansion
of the utility function around the expected end-of-period wealth V e,w eh a v e
U(V ) ≈ U(V
e)+U




· (V − V
e)
2 (A.2)
From (A.1) and (A.2) it follows that the expected utility of the investor’s end-of-period
wealth is approximately given by

































q are the expected net rates of return on unquoted and quoted shares, re-
spectively; e σ
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u and e σ
2
q are the variances of these rates of return, and e σuq is their covariance.
Given the expected rates of return and the risk characteristics of the three asset types,
the investor chooses his portfolio shares vu and vq so as to maximize his expected utility.
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where ρ ≡− U  /U  is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
A shareholder income tax without a rate-of-return allowance
Suppose the government levies a symmetric residence-based personal tax at the rate
t on all returns to shares. If rj and re
j are the actual and expected pre-tax returns to
shares of type j,w et h e nh a v e
Rj =( 1− t)rj,R
e
j =( 1− t)r
e
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j and σuq are the variances and the covariance of the pre-tax rates of return,

























T h er e q u i r e de x p e c t e dr a t eo fr e t u r nre
q on quoted shares is exogenously given from
the world market and hence unaﬀected by the shareholder income tax. To see how the tax
aﬀects the required expected return re
u on unquoted shares, we solve (A.10) for ρ(1 − t)Vo


















The variable h β in (A.11) may be either smaller or greater than unity, so a shareholder
income tax without a rate-of-return allowance will not necessarily drive up the required
return on unquoted shares, as already pointed out by Apel and Södersten (1999). To
provide some intuition for this result, consider an investor with a well-diversiﬁed portfolio
where unquoted shares carry a relatively small weight. In this case where vu → 0,i t
follows from the deﬁnition given in (A.11) that h β → σuq/σ2
q. The variance of the return
on the ’market portfolio’ tends towards σ2
q when vu → 0.O u rv a r i a b l eh β then becomes
roughly equal to the ’beta’ known from the conventional Capital Asset Pricing Model.
For unquoted shares with a relatively high covariance with the market portfolio (h β > 1),
the required risk premium will be high, because the holding of such shares adds to the
aggregate risk on the investor’s portfolio. For such risky shares the beneﬁtf r o mt h e
income insurance oﬀered by a symmetric shareholder income tax (with full loss oﬀset)
outweighs the fact that the tax reduces the average net rate of return relative to the net
return on safe assets. Accordingly, we see from (A.11) that the tax will reduce the required
26return on unquoted shares when h β > 1. Conversely, for unquoted shares with a relatively
low h β (<1), the tax will drive up the required return. Thus a shareholder income tax
without a rate-of-return allowance will tend to stimulate investment in companies whose
proﬁts vary strongly with the business cycle, at the expense of investment in companies
with a low sensitivity to the cycle.
Introducing a rate-of-return allowance
Consider next a shareholder income tax levied only on the equity premium,d e ﬁned
as the excess of the rate of return on shares over the after-tax interest rate on risk-free
bonds. In this case the actual and expected after-tax returns on shares will be
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whereas the variances and the covariance of the net rates of return will still be given by
(A.7) and (A.8), as the reader may easily verify. Substitution of (A.7), (A.8) and (A.12)
into (A.4) and (A.5) then yield
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It follows directly from (A.13) and (A.14) that a shareholder income tax with an
RRA will have no impact on the required return to unquoted shares in the absence of
uncertainty (σ2
u = σ2
uq =0 ) or when investors are risk-neutral (ρ =0 ). This conﬁrms the
neutrality result illustrated by our numerical example in section 3.2.











where h β is deﬁned in (A.11). Recall that when portfolios are well-diversiﬁed, we have
h β → σuq/σ2
q. Thus it follows from (A.15) that a shareholder income tax with a rate-of-
return allowance will have a negligible impact on the required return on unquoted shares
27when these shares only carry a small weight in investor portfolios. This is the basis for
the claim made in this paper that the tax will be approximately neutral when investors
are well-diversiﬁed.
Note that the neutrality result in (A.15) does not require the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion (ρ) to be constant. However, in the analysis below we will make the simplifying
assumption that ρ is indeed constant.
General equilibrium
T oa n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r ei n v e s t o r sa r el e s sw e l ld i v e r s i ﬁe d ,i ti su s e f u lt om o v ef r o m
the level of the individual investor to the macro level. If K is the aggregate capital stock
invested in unquoted companies at the start of the period; π i st h er a t eo fp r o ﬁto nt h i s
capital stock (after payment of corporation tax), and q is the ratio of the market value to





































π is the variance of π, σπq i st h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e nπ and rq,a n dπe is the
expected proﬁtr a t e . T h es p e c i ﬁcation of ru in (A.16) assumes that corporate proﬁts
generate shareholder income either in the form of dividends or in the form of capital
gains on shares. At the macro level we have vu ≡ qK/Vo and vq ≡ Sq/Vo,w h e r eSq
denotes the aggregate stock of quoted shares held by domestic residents. Using these
deﬁnitions along with (A.16) and (A.17), we may rewrite (A.13) and (A.14) as
π
















In the short run considered here, the initial capital stock in unquoted companies is
predetermined. Moreover, πe is given by the state of expectations, i is determined by
28monetary policy, and re
q is exogenously given from abroad. However, even in the short
run investors can adjust their aggregate holdings of quoted shares by buying or selling in
the international stock market. Equation (A.19) then determines the equilibrium value
of Sq, and subsequently we may insert the solution for Sq into (A.18) to ﬁnd the short
run equilibrium value of q (and hence the value of re
u ≡ πe/q). If a rise in the tax rate t
reduces the value of q, it will drive up re
u, thereby reducing the real investment activity
of unquoted companies over time. Using (A.1), (A.16) through (A.19) and the formula





























q +( 1− vu − vq)i, c ≡
σuq
σqσu
where h ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, measured at the representative investor’s
level of expected end-of-period wealth; and Re is the average expected after-tax rate of
return on the aggregate portfolio held by domestic investors. Since the coeﬃcient of
correlation c cannot exceed 1 numerically, the expression in (A.20) is non-positive and
generally negative. Thus the shareholder income tax will generally tend to reduce the
required return to unquoted shares, as we explained in section 3.3. However, note that
(A.20) is consistent with our earlier neutrality result: if the market value of the assets
invested in unquoted ﬁrms is small relative to aggregate investor wealth so that vu is
close to zero, dre/dt will also be close to zero, and the shareholder income tax will be
approximately neutral towards real investment decisions.
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291. Combining OECD Revenue Statistics and National Accounts, Carey and Rabesona
(2002) estimate average eﬀective tax rates on capital income and labour income. They
ﬁnd that in many countries preferential tax arrangements for household capital income
signiﬁcantly reduce the overall eﬀective tax rate on income from capital while increasing
the estimated eﬀective tax rate on labour income.
2. The Nordic countries also include most social security transfers in the base for the
progressive surtax.
3. Andersson et al. (1998) provide more details on the ambitious business tax reforms in
Norway and the other Nordic countries in the early 1990s.
4. While this paper focuses only on Norway, Hagen and Sørensen (1998) and Lindhe,
Södersten and Öberg (2001) oﬀer a comparative analysis of the taxation of ﬁrms with
active owners in the various Nordic countries.
5. The empirical study by Fjærli and Lund (2001) indicates that the desire to mini-
mize tax bills has had a strong eﬀe c to nt h ef o r mi nw h i c ha c t i v eo w n e r so fN o r w e g i a n
corporations have chosen to take out cash from the ﬁrm.
6. The proposed shareholder income tax is in fact rather similar to the current Swedish
tax rules for holders of shares in companies which are not listed on the stock exchange.
However, because the Swedish tax rules favour unquoted companies relative to quoted
companies, they are non-neutral towards real investment incentives, in contrast to the
proposal described in this paper. See Sørensen (2003) for an analysis of the Swedish rules
compared to the rules proposed for Norway.
7. This is reasonable: as long as retentions do not trigger any current capital gains tax
and do not generate any future dividend tax at the time of distribution, there will be no
tax capitalization eﬀects on share values.
8. For the moment, we are implicitly assuming risk neutrality or abstracting from uncer-
tainty. We will deal with uncertainty and risk aversion in the next section.
9. In a model of a closed economy with well diversiﬁed consumers, Gordon (1985) also
ﬁn d st h a tac a p i t a li n c o m et a xw h i c he x e m p t st h er i s kf r e er a t eo fr e t u r nw i l lb en e u -
tral, provided tax revenues are transferred back to taxpayers in a lump sum manner.
By contrast, the neutrality result in the open-economy model set up in Sørensen (2003)
implicitly assumes that tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public goods which enter in-
30vestor utility functions in an additively separable manner. On this assumption Gordon’s
closed-economy model would predict that a symmetric tax on the equity premium will
stimulate investment in risky assets by reducing uncertainty regarding private consump-
tion possibilities.
10. This tendency of a symmetric tax on the equity premium to stimulate risk taking is
well known from the literature. See Sandmo (1977 and 1989).
11. The committee’s proposals imply that separate accounts must be kept for each of
the taxpayers’ shares in each company. For such a system to be manageable, it must
be based on a central shareholder register recording the acquisition and sale of shares
and the payment of dividends by companies. With such a register, which was already
planned in Norway before the tax reform committee was established, the tax liability on
each share may be calculated on a computerized basis.
12. In Denmark and Sweden similar tax rules for proprietors already exist.
13. The neutrality of the cash ﬂow tax holds only when the tax rate is constant over
time, as stressed by Sandmo (1979). Neutrality also requires that the investor’s function
for valuation of risky cash ﬂows satisﬁes the property of value additivity, as deﬁned by
Fane (1987). Value additivity holds for any valuation model in ﬁnancial theory such as
the CAPM, the APT, and option valuation models.
14. This is essentially the critique raised by Bond (2000) against the ACE system. Simi-
lar concerns seem to have put an end to the recent Italian experiment with a progressive
(dual) business income tax. See Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini (2001) for a discus-
sion of the Italian dual business income tax.
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